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The case United States—Measures Concerning the Importation and Marketing and Sale 
of Tuna and Tuna Products concerns whether United States (US) “dolphin-safe” labeling 
requirements comply with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).2  Mexico brought a series of WTO claims against US 
labeling criteria under which tuna products may be labeled “dolphin-safe.” The fishing practices 
predominantly used by the Mexican tuna fleet do not meet these criteria, even though they 
comply with the “dolphin-safe” standards provided in an international conservation treaty to 
protect dolphins negotiated among the US, Mexico, and twelve other countries that border or fish 
for tuna in the Eastern Tropic Pacific (ETP).  
Mexico made three substantive claims under the TBT Agreement, as well as claims under 
the General Agreement on International Trade (GATT).3  It claimed that the US labeling 
measures provided “less favorable treatment” to Mexican tuna under TBT Article 2.1; 
constituted “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” under TBT Article 2.2; and failed to 
comply with applicable international standards under TBT Article 2.4. Both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body (AB) ruled against the US, but on different grounds. The Panel ruled that 
although the US measures were non-discriminatory under Article 2.1, they were more trade-
restrictive than necessary under Article 2.2 because a less trade-restrictive alternative was 
available that met US conservation and consumer objectives. Both the US and Mexico appealed 
and the AB overruled the panel on both findings, holding that although the US law was not more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to meet the US objectives under Article 2.2, it was discriminatory 
under Article 2.1.  
The case was one of three WTO Appellate Body decisions issued in 2012 that interpreted 
and applied the key substantive provisions of the TBT Agreement for the first time.4 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For the final published version, please see the AJIL publication in 2013. 
2 Panel Report, United States--Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) (Panel Report) and Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) (AB 
Report). 
3 The panel did not assess Mexico’s GATT claims for reasons of “judicial economy.” The AB found that this 
constituted a “false” use of judicial economy, but it did not “complete the analysis.”AB Report, paras 405-406. 
4  Appellate Body Report, United States--Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 
WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) (AB Report, US-Clove Cigarettes); Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2176863
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decision is of systemic importance for its interpretation of the TBT Agreement’s substantive 
obligations; the types of labeling that fall within the scope of the Agreement; the legitimacy of 
labeling based on foreign, non-product-related process and production methods (PPMs); and the 
relation of other international law to WTO law.  
   
A. Factual Background and Context. In the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP), schools of 
tuna often swim with dolphins, such that tuna trawlers can locate and catch the tuna by “setting” 
on dolphins with purse seine nets. In the 1980s, approximately 100,000 dolphins died annually 
from this fishing practice. In the 1970s, the US began to regulate the practice, and, in 1984, US 
law banned the use of the fishing practice by US vessels (subject to some conditional exceptions 
in the ETP), and called for a ban by 1991 of the import of tuna from countries that did not adopt 
an environmental program comparable in its effectiveness to protect dolphins.5 Following a court 
injunction, the US government implemented the ban on Mexican tuna imports in 1991. The US 
import ban triggered the most controversial case in the history of the GATT, the US-tuna-
dolphin decision of 1991 in which a GATT panel found that the US ban on Mexican tuna 
imports failed to comply with the US’s obligations under the GATT in light of its coercive, 
extraterritorial nature.6 The US blocked adoption of the panel report, but the report stirred 
environmentalists’ concerns with international trade law that have continued ever since.  
Following the 1991 GATT report, the US and Mexico engaged in negotiations with other 
countries that border or fish for tuna in the ETP which gave rise to a series of agreements to 
address dolphin conservation concerns, including the 1992 La Jolla Agreement, the 1995 Panama 
Declaration, and the 1998 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program 
(AIDCP).7 Under these agreements, the parties developed an International Dolphin Conservation 
Program (IDCP) that eventually established binding annual fleet-wide mortality limits 
apportioned into individual vessel limits; required the use of particular gear, equipment, and 
catching practices; mandated training for captains; and required a third party observer on all 
vessels who would certify whether any dolphin were killed or seriously injured. The results have 
been significant, with scientists reporting that dolphin mortality in the ETP has declined by over 
99%, from around 132,000 per year in the mid-1980s to around 1,200 per year in recent years. 
The dolphin population is now recovering, although whether the recovery rate is sufficient is 
disputed.8 Scholars working in the “new governance” experimentalist tradition have hailed the 
outcome as a form of an inclusive, cooperative, innovative standard-setting process.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R (June 29, 2012) (AB Report, US-
COOL Labeling). 
5 Pub. L. 98-364, July 17, 1984, 98 STAT. 440; Pub. L. 100-711, Nov. 23, 1988, 102 STAT. 4755. 
6 Panel Report, United States--Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), 
reprinted in 30 ILM 1594 (Aug. 16, 1991) (unadopted) (Panel Report, Tuna I). 
7 See Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, May 28, 1998, T.I.A.S. 12956, in force 15 
Feb. 1999, available at http://www.iattc.org/IDCPENG.htm; and Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse 
of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing the 1992 La Jolla Agreement, the 1995 Panama Declaration, and the 1998 
AIDCP). 
8 Panel Report, paras. 7.557 and 7.609 (citing variation in estimates from 1.4% increase per year to increases near 
the 4-8% maximum possible). See also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: 
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265 
(2012). 
9 See Sabel & Simon, supra note…. 
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In 1990, the US created a regime for the labeling of tuna as “dolphin-safe” under the 
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA), which was targeted, in particular, at 
tuna fishing practices in the ETP. Under the original DPCIA, no tuna could be labeled as 
“dolphin-safe” when they were caught by the method of setting on dolphin in the ETP. 10 The 
Annex to the 1995 Panama Declaration; however, provided for “Envisioned Changes in United 
States Law” which included permitting the labeling of tuna as “dolphin-safe” caught with purse 
seine nets in the ETP provided that an observer documented that there was no “dolphin 
mortality” in the set.11  
In 1997, five major environmental NGOs that had pressed for the international 
conservation agreements supported the US Congress’ termination of the ban against imports 
from countries in compliance with the IDCP, as well as amendment of the US “dolphin-safe” 
labeling law, the DPCIA.12 Congress amended the DPCIA to provide that tuna caught by the 
method of setting on dolphin in the ETP could be labeled as “dolphin-safe” when an 
international observer certifies that no dolphin were killed or seriously injured in the set, 
provided that the US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) finds that the setting on 
dolphins is not “having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the ETP.”13 
NMFS made this finding in 2002, and Mexican tuna were briefly permitted to use the AIDCP 
“dolphin-safe” label in the US. A US environmental group, the Earth Island Institute, then 
successfully challenged NMFS’ findings in federal court. As a result of a 2007 US 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision, the US government again prohibits the use of a “dolphin-safe” label 
for any tuna caught in the ETP through setting on dolphins.14 The major US canners and 
distributors only buy tuna that can be labeled “dolphin-safe,” effectively shutting most Mexican 
tuna out of the US market.15 In 2008, Mexico filed a WTO complaint challenging the US 
measure, collectively consisting of the DPCIA, the US implementing regulations, and the 9th 
Circuit decision. The WTO Panel issued its decision in September 2011, and the AB its decision 
in May 2012. 
 
 
B. The Panel and AB Reports.  
1. Application of the TBT Agreement. Before assessing the substantive issues, the panel 
had to decide if the TBT Agreement applied to the measure. The substantive provisions of the 
TBT Agreement only apply to “technical regulations,” which are defined as “mandatory.”16 The 
United States maintained that the US labeling measure was “voluntary” because it did not 
mandate that tuna products be labeled “dolphin-safe” so that private parties had the option to use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Pub. L. 101-627, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 STAT. 4465. 
11	  Declaration of Panama, Oct. 4, 1995, reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S396, S397 (1997).	  
12  See Parker, supra note __, at 45 (stating that the five major environmental NGOs were Greenpeace, 
Environmental Defense Fund, World Wildlife Fund, Center for Marine Conservation, and National Wildlife 
Federation). 
13 16 U.S.C. § 1385(g)(1)-(2) (2006). 
14	  See Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007).	  
15 There is some evidence that US canners and distributors, pressed by the threat of an NGO-organized boycott, 
might still not accept an AIDCP “dolphin-safe” label, but currently US law prohibits such use in any case. 
16 Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement (“[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related 
processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is 
mandatory. It may also include… labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method” 
(emphases added)). 
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the label “dolphin-safe” (when meeting the criteria) or sell the tuna products without the label. A 
number of third parties in the case, including Australia, the European Union and New Zealand, 
supported the US interpretation, while Brazil and Japan supported Mexico’s.17  
The majority of the panel sided with Mexico in a 2-1 decision, while one panelist agreed 
with the US. The majority found that the US requirements were mandatory in that they set out 
“the conditions under which” tuna can be labeled as “dolphin-safe” and apply sanctions against 
parties that label tuna in “violation” of these conditions. The AB upheld the majority’s decision 
based on “the circumstances of the case.”18 The special nature of the US labeling law should thus 
be taken into account before reaching any conclusion regarding the implications for all “social 
labeling” requirements. The US law effectively prohibits the use of any mention of dolphin 
safety on cans of tuna that do not meet US regulatory requirements, which effectively prohibits 
Mexico from labeling tuna to highlight the substantial dolphin-protection measures that it has 
taken under the AIDCP and its predecessor agreements. 
 
2. Article 2.1 Claim of Discrimination. Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides that 
“Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the 
territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country” (emphasis 
added). In its decision, the AB applied analysis that parallels what is used in GATT Article III:4. 
It also read provisions of the preamble of the TBT Agreement that mirror language in the 
chapeau of GATT Article XX (regarding “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination”) as 
“context” for interpreting this provision. In this way, although an Article XX defense is not 
formally available for TBT claims, the language in an Article XX defense has been incorporated 
into the analysis of the claim.19 
The US maintained that its labeling provisions are non-discriminatory under Article 2.1 
because they are origin-neutral; that is, they apply equally to tuna caught by US and foreign 
fleets. Mexico noted that the US tuna fleet fished almost exclusively outside of the ETP and thus 
was not subject to the more restrictive “dolphin-safe” labeling provisions, giving rise to 
discrimination. The Panel agreed with the US, finding that the US law was non-discriminatory 
because the Mexican fleet had the equal opportunity to comply with the US labeling standards by 
not using purse seine nets in the ETP or by fishing outside of the ETP. It found that any adverse 
impact on the Mexican fleet was “primarily the result of factors or circumstances unrelated to the 
foreign origin of the product.”20 Its finding reflected that of the 1991 GATT tuna-dolphin report, 
which found that the US “dolphin-safe” labeling standard was non-discriminatory because it was 
not based on the nationality of the tuna vessels so that any trade effects resulted from consumer 
choice.21 
The Appellate Body reversed the panel, finding that the US labeling provisions adversely 
affected “the conditions for competition in the US market” to the detriment of Mexican tuna 
products. The AB cited factual findings of the panel that the US applied stringent “dolphin-safe” 
labeling requirements for tuna caught in the ETP, but significantly more lenient labeling rules for 
tuna caught outside of the ETP, even though tuna fleets in other oceans used fishing techniques, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 AB Report, paras. 138, 140, -141, 154-155, 161-163, and 166-167.  
18 AB Report, para. 199. 
19 See also AB Report, US-Clove Cigarettes, paras. 96 & 109. 
20 Panel Report, para. 7.378. 
21 Panel Report, Tuna I, paras. 5.42-5.43. 
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such as trolls, gillnets, and fish aggregating devices (FADs), that resulted in significant harm to 
dolphins.22 The AB did not accept that the US measures were proportionately calibrated to the 
likelihood of injury to dolphins, and was thus not “even-handed.”23  
 The AB nonetheless indicated that it could be relatively easy for the US to comply with 
the decision, noting “the possibility that only the captain provide such a certification.”24 If the 
US amends its labeling requirement to require a certification from only the captain of tuna 
vessels fishing in other oceans and using other fishing techniques, Mexico could challenge the 
US for failing to comply with the decision because it is not “even-handed.” The AB, however, 
indicated that Mexico would not be successful because the US may calibrate its labeling 
requirements to address the relative regulatory compliance costs involved in relation to the 
relative risks of harm to dolphins in different oceans from different fishing practices.25 
 
3. Article 2.2 Claim for Unnecessary Obstacles to International Trade. Article 2.2 of the 
TBT Agreement prohibits “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” where the obstacle is 
“more trade-restrictive than necessary” to meet the standard setter’s “legitimate objective.”26 To 
determine whether a measure is “necessary,” the AB stated that a panel should weigh and 
balance “(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to the legitimate objective; (ii) the 
trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and (iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of 
consequences that would arise from non-fulfilment of the objective(s).”27 The AB, however, did 
not engage in such balancing, but rather focused on whether the alternative offered by Mexico 
would meet the US objectives.  
The US stated that its legitimate objectives were, on the one hand, to ensure that 
consumers were not misled by the labels, and, on the other hand, to protect dolphins. Mexico 
proposed a “less trade-restrictive alternative” that would meet these objectives under which the 
US would permit the labeling of Mexican tuna as “dolphin-safe” under the IDCP since these 
standards were at least as protective of dolphins and informative to consumers as those used by 
the US. The Panel agreed with Mexico, finding that the current US labeling requirements only 
partially ensured that tuna labeled as “dolphin safe” would protect dolphins and inform 
consumers given the documented risks to dolphins from fishing techniques used in other oceans. 
The Panel thus found that permitting the use of the AIDCP “dolphin-safe” label was a less trade-
restrictive alternative that met the US objectives to the same degree.28  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 These practices can also result in greater harm to other bycatch, including fish that may be endangered or 
depleted, than the practice of setting on dolphins. See Sable & Simon, supra note…, at 1294; Parker, supra note__, 
at 38. 
23 AB Report, para. 297. 
24 AB Report, para. 291. The AB also wrote that “nowhere” did the Panel state that “imposing a requirement that an 
independent observer certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the course of the fishing operations 
in which the tuna was caught would be the only way for the United States to calibrate its “dolphin-safe’ labeling 
provisions.” Id. 
25 AB Report, paras. 293-297 
26 Article 2.2 provides: “Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a 
view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  For this purpose, technical 
regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the 
risks non-fulfilment would create.  Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia:  national security requirements; the 
prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment….”  
27 AB Report, paras 321-322. 
28 Panel Report, paras. 7.618-7.621. 
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 The Appellate Body reversed the panel. Given the potential unobserved consequences of 
setting on dolphins (such as through injury, stress, or the separation of calves from mothers), and 
since setting purse seine nets on dolphins do kill and injure around 1,200 dolphins per year, the 
AB found that the stricter US standard is protective of dolphin in the ETP to a greater degree.29 
The AB critiqued the panel for making the wrong comparison between the US labeling of tuna 
inside and outside of the ETP, rather than comparing the two alternatives for labeling tuna that 
were caught inside the ETP.  
 
4. Article 2.4 Claim for Failure to Comply with International Standards. Article 2.4 of the 
TBT Agreement maintains that, “where international standards exist,” WTO Members are to use 
them “as a basis for their technical regulations except when” their use “would be an ineffective 
or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the [Member’s] legitimate objectives.”30 The parties 
to the IDCP agreed that “[d]olphin safe tuna is tuna captured in sets in which there is not 
mortality or serious injury of dolphins,” and they created an AIDCP “dolphin-safe” label under 
this standard in 2001.31 Mexico contended that the AIDCP standard for “dolphin-safe” labeling 
was an international standard that is an effective and appropriate means to meet the United 
States’ legitimate objectives.  
The Panel agreed that the AIDCP standard was an international standard and that the US 
had failed to base its labeling provisions on it. The Panel nonetheless found that Mexico failed to 
demonstrate that the AIDCP standard constituted an effective means to meet the US objectives 
because the US standard was more protective of dolphins in the ETP than the AIDCP alternative. 
In its analysis of the Article 2.4 claim, the Panel focused on a comparison of the relative 
effectiveness of the US and international standard within the ETP, unlike in its analysis of 
Mexico’s Article 2.2 claim. The Panel did so because an Article 2.4 claim contends that the 
domestic standard should be based on the international one, and the international standard only 
applied to the ETP.  
In hearing appeals from the US and Mexico, the AB overruled the panel on the issue of 
whether the AIDCP labeling standard was an “international standard.” The AB found that in 
order to constitute an international standard, the standard had to be adopted by “an international 
standardizing body,”32 and that the AIDCP did not constitute one because it was not “open” for 
all WTO members to join. In support of its decision, the AB cited Annex 1.5 to the TBT 
Agreement that defines an “international body” as one “whose membership is open to the 
relevant bodies of at least all Members.”33 The AB also cited a 2000 TBT Committee decision 
that sets out principles and procedures that international standardizing bodies should observe, 
finding that it constituted “a ’subsequent agreement’ of the parties within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”34 (which could have implications for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 AB Report, paras. 229-330. 
30 Article 2.4 provides: “Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical 
regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate 
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or 
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.” 
31 IDCP Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, May 28, 1998, T.I.A.S. 12956; see Panel 
Report, para 2.40. 
32 AB Report, para 356. 
33 AB Report, para 358. 
34 AB Report, para 372. 
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future decision making by committees). The Committee decision maintains that “[m]embership 
of an international standardizing body should be open on a non-discriminatory basis… at every 
stage of standards development.”35 The AB maintained that the analysis of “openness” had to be 
made “on a case-by-case basis,” and found that the AIDCP was not a body open to all WTO 
members because a Member must be “invited” to join it and Mexico failed to prove that 
acceptance of the invitation “occurred automatically.”36 The AB was “not persuaded” by 
Mexico’s argument that being invited to join the AIDCP is only a “formality,” and that “[n]o 
additional countries or regional economic integration organizations have expressed interest in 
joining the AIDCP.”37  
 
C. Four Systemic Issues. Mexico primarily wanted the US to grant Mexican tuna access 
to the US market under the AIDCP “dolphin-safe” label. The Panel’s decision would have 
granted it such access. In contrast, the AB decision permits the US to exclude Mexican tuna from 
using the AIDCP “dolphin safe” label in the US, provided the US applies more stringent 
“dolphin-safe” labeling requirements to tuna caught throughout the world. Although the US 
formally lost the Article 2.1 claim, it appears that the US should be able to comply with the AB 
decision, as the US did in the famous US-shrimp-turtle case.38 
The AB decision is important in at least four systemic respects. First, the decision 
clarifies the meaning of the core substantive provisions of the TBT Agreement, Articles 2.1 and 
2.2. In doing so, the AB incorporated traditional GATT analysis, although TBT Article 2.2 
creates a substantive claim not provided under the GATT. While the analogue to TBT Article 2.1 
is GATT Articles I and III.1 (respectively covering most-favored-nation and national-treatment 
obligations), the language of TBT Article 2.2 is used only when assessing an Article XX defense 
to an underlying GATT violation such as to GATT’s most-favored-nation and national treatment 
clauses. As a result, the TBT Agreement appears to be more constraining of domestic regulatory 
choices than the GATT, subject to how it is interpreted. 
In all three AB decisions in 2012 under the TBT Agreement, the AB found that the 
respondent (in each case the US) failed to comply with Article 2.1 non-discrimination 
obligations, but did not violate Article 2.2 obligations concerning “unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade.” These AB decisions, two of which involved reversals of a Panel finding of 
non-compliance with Article 2.2, indicate that it will be more difficult for complainants to win 
Article 2.2 claims because of the AB’s focus on the “degree” to which an alternative meets a 
respondent’s objective, which can be narrowly defined.39 In this way, the AB appears to have 
aligned the interpretation of the TBT Agreement more closely with traditional GATT claims and 
defenses. From a legal realist perspective, the AB did so because it arguably is more comfortable 
assessing whether a national regulatory measure is discriminatory than assessing whether it is 
“unnecessary,” from the standpoint of the AB’s legitimacy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 AB Report, paga 373 (citing TBT Committee Decision, 6th ed.). 
36 AB Report, paras. 386 & 398. 
37 AB Report, para 398. 
38 See Gregory Shaffer, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 93 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 507 (1999).  
39 In AB Report, US-COOL Labeling, the AB found that the country-of-origin labeling requirements were 
“disproportionate” and not “even-handed” under Article 2.1, but were not more trade restrictive than necessary 
under Article 2.2 because the regulations provided more information to consumers than the proposed alternative. See 
AB Report, US COOL Labeling, paras. 347 and 349. 
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Second, the AB clarified the application of the TBT Agreement to labels. Had the AB 
held that the US measure was not a “technical regulation,” it would have created a potentially 
large carve-out under the TBT Agreement. Mexico would then have been limited to a TBT 
Article 4.1 claim that the US did not ensure compliance with the Code of Good Practice set forth 
in Annex 3 to the Agreement (which contains parallel obligations to those in TBT Article 2, but 
which have yet to be interpreted),40 and to claims under the GATT. 
Third, the case involved labeling based on a foreign, non-product-related PPM applying 
to the catching of tuna on the high seas and in foreign territorial waters. The AB implicitly found 
that the fault in the US measure was not that it regulated a foreign PPM, but rather that its scope 
of application was too narrow in applying a stringent labeling requirement only to tuna caught in 
the ETP; in this respect, the AB discussed evidence of the depletion of dolphin stocks off the 
coasts of Ghana and Togo, as well as of Thailand and the Philippines.41 Mexico noted that the 
US objective was to “ensur[e] that the US market is not used to encourage” particular fishing 
practices, and contended that the US objective was “illegitimate” on this ground “because its 
purpose is to ‘coerce’ another WTO Member to change its practices to comply with a unilateral 
policy.”42 The AB decided against Mexico by focusing on the dolphin-protective aspect of the 
US objective, and thus accepted the US measure based on a foreign PPM without engaging on 
the extraterritoriality issue. It will be interesting to see the implications of this acceptance of a 
measure based on foreign PPMs, although the measure only concerned PPM labeling applying to 
a product, as expressly referenced in the TBT definition of a “technical regulation.”43  
Fourth the AB addressed the relation of other international agreements to a party’s WTO 
obligations. The AB decision to not recognize the AIDCP as an “international standard” could be 
viewed as a means of promoting transparency and participation in international standard-setting 
processes. Yet one should question whether its approach will actually promote international 
environmental standard setting since it is easier to reach agreements with fewer participants. If 
all WTO Members participated, including those that have no interest in protecting dolphin in the 
ETP, effective conservation efforts could be impeded. Moreover, Taiwan is not a member of the 
United Nations and so, in fact, there are no international environmental standard setting 
organizations open to all WTO members. If this approach is followed, it effectively undermines 
TBT Article 2.5 which provides that a country whose technical regulation is in accordance with a 
relevant international standard is “rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to 
international trade.” Interestingly, the WTO itself would not meet the AB’s criteria of 
“openness” and “automaticity,” as attested by the fifteen and eighteen years that China and 
Russia respectively negotiated to join the organization.  
Finally, the US initiated a case under NAFTA in 2010, calling into question the relation 
of WTO and NAFTA obligations regarding trade and environment claims. The US contended 
that Mexico was obligated under NAFTA Article 2005(4) to honor an earlier request of the US to 
resolve the dispute under NAFTA.44  The NAFTA case has not proceeded because of the ability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Annex 3, paras. D-F. This issue has yet to be subject to a WTO dispute. 
41 See AB Report, par. 275-278. 
42 Paras. 335-339. 
43 See the definition in supra note… 
44 NAFTA Article 2005(4) provides: “In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 where the responding Party claims 
that its action is subject to Article 104 (Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements) and requests in 
writing that the matter be considered under this Agreement, the complaining Party may, in respect of that matter, 
thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under this Agreement.” See Jamie Strawbridge, U.S. 
Tuna-Dolphin Request Could Clarify NAFTA-WTO Relationship, Inside US TRADE, Oct 1, 2010. 
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of a NAFTA party (in this case Mexico) to effectively block the formation of a NAFTA arbitral 
panel under Chapter 20 of NAFTA by opposing the selection of panelists. The US, which has 
also blocked the hearing of NAFTA claims brought by Mexico, did not raise this issue in the 
WTO case. 
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